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The Reinvestment Deduction: 
 A Modest Proposal to Reform the Taxation of 
Business Income 
David Hasen* 
INTRODUCTION 
Thoughts of fundamental tax reform are rarely far from the 
minds of policy makers and tax specialists, but problems of 
political choice appear to have dimmed its prospects for the 
foreseeable future.1 As evidence, consider that agreement across 
a wide segment of the political spectrum on reform principles has 
prevailed for a number of years, but Congress lately has been 
unable to advance a major reform proposal, despite efforts from 
members of both major parties to do so.2 In the meantime, 
narrow tax breaks of various sorts continue to proliferate in 
response to lobbying efforts by organized groups, despite the 
consensus among analysts that most such provisions are 
ill-advised.3 
It would seem, therefore, that proposals for reform in the 
near term need to be relatively modest in ambition if they are to 
receive consideration from policy makers. The challenge is to 
advance ideas that represent policy improvements on their own 
but that also tend in the direction of desirable broader-scale 
 
 * Associate Professor, Santa Clara University Law School. Thanks to participants at 
Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law’s 2014 Business Tax Reform 
Symposium. Unless otherwise stated, all section citations are to the U.S. Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, title 26 U.S. Code. 
 1 See Jonathan Weisman, The Tax Wilderness, Untamed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2014, 
at BU7 (describing the “consensus” in Washington: “There will be no comprehensive tax 
code overhaul this year . . . .”). 
 2 For the political fate of House Ways and Means Chair Rep. Dave Camp’s (R-MI) 
proposal, see Brian Faler et al., How the GOP Lost Its Nerve on Tax Reform, POLITICO 
(Dec. 5, 2013, 5:03 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/tax-code-gop-leaders-1006 
93.html. For the political fate of Senate Finance Committee Chair Max Baucus’s (D-MT) 
proposal, see Kelsey Snell, Max Baucus Tax Reform Proposal at Risk, POLITICO (July 30, 
2013, 9:18 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/07/max-baucus-tax-reform-
94894.html. 
 3 As examples, since 2000, bonus depreciation, § 179, and the bonus depreciation 
allowance, § 168(k), have repeatedly been enacted with sunset provisions and renewed. 
See GARY GUENTHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31852, SECTION 179 AND BONUS 
DEPRECIATION EXPENSING ALLOWANCES: CURRENT LAW, LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS IN THE 
112TH CONGRESS, AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS 4–10, (2012), available at https://www.fas.org/ 
sgp/crs/misc/RL31852.pdf (detailing legislative histories). 
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reform. In addition, and as contrasted with global reform 
proposals, more-modest proposals need to be especially sensitive 
to “second-best” problems because of their incremental nature. A 
second-best problem arises when adoption of a reform that is 
favorable when viewed in isolation makes things worse overall 
because of its interaction with other features of the system that 
the reform does not address.4 Because modest proposals by 
definition seek to advance policy goals on a piecemeal basis, they 
inevitably interact with other features of the law not subject to 
change under the proposal; where these features are themselves 
problematic from a policy perspective, adopting the modest 
change may lead to an undesirable shift towards behavior that 
the undesirable feature encourages. 
This Essay is offered in the spirit of incremental reform. It 
recommends enactment of a deduction to individuals for 
promptly reinvested distributions received on corporate equity 
and gains derived from the sale or exchange of corporate equity. 
The reform is largely efficiency-oriented. For reasons explained 
below, under current law, the tax on dividends and on gains 
recognized from the sale or exchange of corporate equity that 
would be reinvested in the absence of tax considerations is often 
easily—and often likely—avoided, with the results that 
economically efficient transactions do not occur and tax is not 
collected. Consequently, if enacted, the proposal would remove a 
highly distortionary rule that produces little tax revenue. 
Moreover, though direct revenue gains would not arise, modest 
increases in tax revenue may result simply from the efficiency 
gains. 
The proposal also moves in the direction of 
more-comprehensive reform for which I have argued elsewhere. 
In a recent essay, I advocated the adoption of a uniform tax on all 
business income along the lines of the comprehensive business 
income tax, or CBIT, that the Treasury Department proposed in 
1992.5 The CBIT as originally formulated would have taxed all 
business income once at the entity level, at a flat rate equal to 
the top marginal rate on individuals, which then was 31%. Taxes 
on distributions and on gains from the sale or exchange of 
CBIT-covered entities would have been eliminated. Interest on 
borrowings by CBIT-covered entities would have been 
 
 4 For a discussion of second-best problems, see generally David A. Weisbach, Line 
Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1627 (1999). 
 5 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE 
TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE (1992) [hereinafter TREASURY REPORT], 
available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Pages/integration-paper. 
aspx#summary.  
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non-deductible to payors and non-includible by payees. The 
promised benefits of the original CBIT were considerable. In 
addition to simplification from the repeal of subchapters S, K, 
and much of C, it would have reduced or eliminated three 
significant tax biases: against the corporate form; against equity 
versus debt financing; and against tax-motivated earnings 
distributions or retentions.6 
My earlier essay advocated retention of most features of the 
Treasury’s CBIT but also argued for coupling the CBIT with an 
excise-tax and deduction regime on distributions and gains 
realized on the disposition of CBIT interests similar to that 
proposed here for corporate equity.7 The motivation for the 
additional tax-and-deduction regime was to make the CBIT 
workable in light of constraints absent in 1992. These include 
principally the requirements that revenues increase, but that 
rates on business income fall in response to concerns about 
competitiveness.8 My proposal also suggested other, less 
substantial, modifications to the original CBIT.9 
Taking that larger reform package, or something similar to 
it, as a target, the question is whether the more-modest proposal 
discussed here would represent an improvement. That is, is it an 
improvement taken on its own, does it move in the direction of 
favorable large-scale reform, and is its implementation as a 
standalone reform workable? Because I have addressed the 
second question in the CBIT proposal, the discussion below 
focuses on the first and third questions. Part I outlines the basics 
of the proposal, Part II discusses its efficiency properties with 
respect to the bias against investment in the corporate sector, 
 
 6 See id. at ch. 4. At the time, the top corporate rate exceeded the top individual rate 
by 3%. Id. at 39. This disparity created a tax incentive to distribute earnings. Much more 
commonly in the history of the income tax, the disparity has run in the other direction. 
For all years since passage of the 16th Amendment in 1913, other than 1988 to 1993, the 
top individual bracket has equaled or exceeded the top corporate bracket; for all years 
other than 1988 to 1993 and 2003 to 2013, the top individual bracket has exceeded the top 
corporate bracket. See SOI Tax Stats - Historical Table 23, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 
http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Historical-Table-23 (last updated May 1, 2013) 
(individual rates); TAX POLICY CTR., URBAN INST. & BROOKINGS INST., HISTORICAL TOP 
CORPORATE TAX RATE AND BRACKET: 1909-2013, available at http://www.taxpolicy 
center.org/taxfacts/content/pdf/corporate_historical_bracket.pdf (corporate rates). When 
top individual rates exceed top corporate rates, the tax incentive runs in the other 
direction, toward tax-motivated earnings retention. 
 7 David Hasen, CBIT 2.0: A Proposal to Address U.S. Business Taxation, 140 TAX 
NOTES 909 (2013). 
 8 All recent legislative and executive branch proposals for business tax reform have 
included a substantial reduction in corporate tax rates. See infra note 34. 
 9 These included modifications to the treatment of outbound investment income and 
a lower CBIT rate. Hasen, supra note 7, at 920–23. 
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and Part III considers additional behavioral effects that may 
arise at the corporate level. 
I. PROPOSAL 
Under current law, income of regular, or “C,” corporations is 
taxed at graduated rates that rise to 34% for taxable income from 
$75,000 to $10 million and to 35% for income above that, with 
recapture provisions to ensure that average rates and marginal 
rates converge above certain thresholds.10 In addition, 
distributions in respect of corporate equity made to individuals 
generally are taxable at the shareholder level as net capital gains 
at 15%, or at 20% for individuals having taxable income greater 
than $400,000 per year ($450,000 for married filing jointly).11 
The same 15 and 20% rates apply to long-term gains recognized 
by individuals from the sale or exchange of stock (and other 
property) that is held as a capital asset.12 By contrast, income 
earned by sole proprietors, through the partnership form or by an 
S corporation, generally is taxed just once, at the owner level, at 
graduated rates ranging from 10% to 39.6% for individuals in the 
same brackets as those subject to the 20% rate on dividends and 
long-term capital gains.13 In addition, as of 2013, a 3.8% tax 
applies to an individual’s “net investment income” (“NII”) to the 
extent that the individual’s adjusted gross income (subject to 
some modifications) exceeds $200,000 ($250,000 for married 
filing jointly).14 For most taxpayers, NII includes dividend income 
and income from the sale or exchange of corporate stock.15 The 
tax on NII applies in addition to the regular income tax.16 
The proposal would permit individual shareholders to deduct 
distributions on stock held in C corporations in the year of 
distribution to the extent the distributions were reinvested prior 
to the due date for the return for the taxable year. The deduction 
would apply for both regular income tax and NII tax purposes. 
Reinvestment would not need to be in corporate equity to qualify. 
The proposal would extend the same treatment to timely 
reinvested long-term gains recognized on the sale or exchange of 
 
 10 § 11. In the discussion below, references to corporations and corporate equity 
generally are to taxable C corporations unless stated otherwise. 
 11 § 1(h)(11). 
 12 § 1(h)(1). 
 13 § 1(c)–(d). 
 14 § 1411. Section 1411 was added by section 1402(a)(1) of Pub. L. No. 111-152. It is 
effective for taxable years beginning after 2012. Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1402(a)(4), 124 Stat. 1029, 1060. 
 15 § 1411(c)(1)(A)(i) (dividends); § 1411(c)(1)(A)(iii) (gains from the sale or exchange 
of stock). 
 16 § 1411(a)(1). 
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stock in C corporations. In either case, no basis credit for 
reinvested proceeds would be available. Instead, in the case of 
reinvestment in any business entity, outside basis would not be 
increased to reflect the investment of deducted amounts, and in 
the case of investment in the taxpayer’s sole proprietorship, basis 
in the assets of the proprietorship would be reduced. Because the 
avoided income tax is charged at long-term capital rates,17 basis 
reduction generally would apply to capital assets or to property 
that would generate a “section 1231 gain” or “section 1231 loss” 
on disposition.18 To the extent basis in those assets is insufficient, 
the deduction on the original distribution or sale would be 
denied. 
The overall effect of the proposal is to defer both income tax 
and the tax on NII on distributions and on gains from the sale or 
exchange of C corporation stock until the shareholder spends the 
income on consumption.19 
The following examples illustrate the operation of current 
law and how the proposal would alter current law. 
Example 1: Individuals O1 and O2 (together, Os), 
married calendar-year taxpayers filing jointly, own 100 
shares of common stock in the XYZ corporation. Their 
ordinary income is taxed in the 35%marginal tax 
bracket. Their modified AGI for purposes of the tax on 
NII exceeds the applicable threshold. On January 1 of 
Year 1, XYZ distributes a dividend of $10 per share on 
its common stock, or $1,000, to Os. One month after the 
distribution, Os contribute $1,000 to the ABC corporation 
in exchange for 100 shares of ABC common stock. 
Under current law, Os include the $1,000 in gross income as 
net capital gain (assuming they do not elect to treat the income 
as net investment income for purposes of section 163)20 and are 
taxed at a 15% rate, or $150,21 assuming they do not have 
 
 17 § 1(h)(11). 
 18 § 1231(a)(3). 
 19 Generally, consumption taxation differs from income taxation in that it does not 
reach the return to waiting. See, e.g., Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The 
Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax Over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 
1413, 1417 (2006). If amounts are reinvested in a pass-through entity, subsequent 
earnings are taxed as earned, but the expensing of the cost of the investment (to O) is 
equivalent to exemption of taxation on the time-value return of the investment if the tax 
rate is the same for the deduction and the inclusion. See Daniel I. Halperin & Alvin C. 
Warren, Jr., Understanding Income Tax Deferral, TAX L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) 
(manuscript at 1–2) (on file with author). 
 20 See § 163(d)(4)(B). “Net investment income” for purposes of this provision is not 
the same as it is for section 1411. 
 21 § 1(h)(1)(C). 
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offsetting capital losses.22 Os also owe $38 of tax on the dividend 
under section 1411. Os are left with $812 after taxes, for an 
overall rate on the distribution of 18.8%. Therefore, the $1,000 
investment in ABC requires the investment of an additional $188 
of Os’ after-tax income, which is equivalent to $231.53 of pre-tax 
income, assuming that income is taxed at 18.8%. Os take a 
$1,000 adjusted basis in the ABC stock. 
Under the proposal, Os would deduct the $1,000 investment 
in ABC for purposes of both the income tax and the tax on NII. 
(That is, they would take a $1,000 above-the-line deduction for 
income tax purposes, and they would reduce total NII by $1,000 
for NII tax purposes.) They would not receive basis credit for the 
amount reinvested, regardless of whether ABC was a C 
corporation or an S corporation. Similarly, if they instead 
invested the $1,000 in a partnership, they would receive no basis 
credit in the partnership interest thereby purchased. 
The effect of the denial of outside but not inside basis is to 
cause the deduction to operate as a deferral mechanism. 
Specifically, the availability of basis credit at the entity level 
ensures that the deduction is not offset by excess inclusions, 
while the denial of basis credit at the owner level ensures the 
deduction is recaptured when the taxpayer receives distributions 
that are not again reinvested. Suppose, for example, that ABC is 
a C corporation, and that ABC uses the $1,000 that Os contribute 
to purchase tangible depreciable property having a useful life of 
20 years and 0 salvage value.23 Assume ABC earns a pre-tax 
return of 8% on the property, or $80 per year. In the standard 
case in which full basis is available in the purchased asset, ABC 
would depreciate the property by $50 per year for $30 of net 
annual income. If the property were worthless after 20 years, 
ABC would have no further income or loss. If basis credit were 
given at the owner but not the entity level, ABC would have $80 
per year of taxable income, thereby prematurely recapturing the 
deduction enjoyed by Os and burdening other ABC shareholders 
as well with tax on non-economic income, since the $1,000 
investment is a cost of producing the income. 
Instead, providing depreciable basis in ABC’s hands ensures 
no excess tax at the entity level, thereby preventing other 
shareholders from being over-taxed and preventing Os’ deduction 
from being canceled in whole or part prior to consumption. The 
 
 22 § 1222(11). 
 23 Simplifying assumptions for the computation of depreciation are used for purposes 
of illustration. In practice, a mid-period convention and a declining balance method of 
depreciation would apply to the property. See § 168. 
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deduction is recouped only when Os’ investment is withdrawn, 
either through distributions (or redemptions so treated)24 that 
exceed both ABC’s earnings and profits and Os’ basis in the 
stock,25 or when Os sell the ABC stock (or it is redeemed in a 
transaction qualifying for sale-or-exchange treatment).26 In 
either case, the gain would be capital.27 
If ABC is an S corporation, the denial of outside basis again 
preserves the deduction unless and until distributions exceed 
that basis. Although distributions from ABC would not be eligible 
for the deduction if reinvested, amounts earned through the 
corporation before deducted amounts were distributed would be 
taxed in the same manner as earnings on after-tax equity 
contributed to the corporation. Analogous results would obtain in 
the case of investment in a partnership. The reduced basis in the 
ABC partnership interest (as compared to the basis funded with 
after-tax dollars) would cause distributions to be treated as gains 
from the sale or exchange of property sooner than if basis credit 
had been provided.28 
Because there is no “outside basis” in a sole proprietorship, 
ensuring that the deduction operates as a deferral and not as an 
exemption provision requires a different approach. 
Example 2: The facts are the same as Example 1 under 
the proposal, except that Os contribute $1,000 to O1’s 
sole proprietorship. 
In order to preserve the benefit of the deduction in this 
setting, it is necessary to reduce basis in the assets of the 
enterprise itself. The reduction ought properly be applied to 
assets the gain on disposition of which is capital, since the 
avoided tax is at capital gain rates, and a workable rule would be 
to apply the deduction in proportion to the relative adjusted 
bases of those assets. (A virtue of using adjusted bases rather 
than fair market values is that the taxpayer should have easy 
access to information about the former.) To the extent basis is 
insufficient, the deduction would be denied. The effect of 
reducing basis in the properties of the proprietorship is similar to 
that of reducing the outside basis in the entity. Earnings 
continue to be taxed as before, but depreciation deductions will 
 
 24 § 302(d). 
 25 § 301(c)(3). 
 26 § 302(a) (sale-or-exchange treatment on certain redemptions). 
 27 §§ 1001(a), 1222(3). If the gain were not capital (because, for example, Os are 
dealers in stock), the investment in ABC would not have been deductible in the first place. 
 28 § 731(a) (non-taxation of money distributions not in excess of partner’s basis); 
§ 1368(b) (non-taxation of distributions not in excess of shareholder’s basis in S 
corporation). 
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be less, and gains on the sale or exchange of business property 
will be subject to greater tax than if no deduction had been taken 
on the initial distribution from XYZ. 
Equivalently, the proposal converts the nominal income tax 
on earnings distributions to a consumption tax under certain 
restrictive assumptions. For reasons stated in the earlier 
proposal for a modified CBIT, there are ample grounds to support 
the introduction of explicit consumption taxation of distributions 
into what is nominally an income tax regime, chief among them 
that consumption tax treatment already applies to many such 
gains in practice for the very reasons that motivate the 
proposal.29 For the reasons developed in that discussion and 
alluded to above, C corporation earnings often are not cashed out 
by tax-sensitive investors until the investor is ready to spend 
them on consumption. To that extent, the question is how 
removal of the tax on what is in substance investment 
reallocations (i.e., reinvestment of dividend distributions) affects 
reallocations rather than how it affects revenues or fairness. The 
effect of removing the tax on reallocations is the subject of the 
next section. 
II. EFFICIENCY IMPLICATIONS 
Intuitively, it is not hard to see why a dividend tax reduction 
ought to lead to an efficiency gain. The general view is that 
current law skews investment away from the C corporation form 
because of the “double tax” on corporate equity.30 Specifically, 
because earnings of C corporations are taxed to the corporation 
as earned and again on distribution as dividends, they may be 
subject to an overall effective income tax rate of approximately 
45% for most investors, and 48% for high-bracket investors.31 
These rates apply whether distributed earnings are drawn down 
for consumption or reinvested. Earnings of other business forms 
are taxed to owners once at a maximum rate of 35% for most 
taxpayers and 39.6% for high-bracket individuals.32 The 
corporate-level behavioral effects of the high rate on dividends 
are not entirely clear (they are discussed in the next section), but 
the efficiency costs at the shareholder level are more readily 
identifiable. To the extent shareholders are unable to avoid the 
 
 29 Hasen, supra note 7, at 914–16. 
 30 See, e.g., George R. Zodrow, On the “Traditional” and “New” Views of Dividend 
Taxation, 44 NAT’L TAX J. 497, 497 (1991). 
 31 § 11 (tax on corporations); § 1(h)(11) (treating qualified dividends as net capital 
gain); § 1(h)(1) (imposing a maximum tax on net capital gain of 15% for taxpayers in the 
35% bracket or below on their ordinary income and 20% for taxpayers in the 39.6% 
ordinary income bracket). 
 32 § 1(a)–(d). 
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tax on corporate earnings, the after-tax price of equity increases 
relative to that of alternatives, inducing an exodus of investment 
from the corporate equity sector to other sectors, including debt 
and pass-through enterprises. The drop in corporate sector equity 
investment raises the return to capital that remains there, but 
the overall effect is a macro-level misallocation of equity capital 
between the corporate and non-corporate sectors.33 
If the law otherwise remains unchanged, the proposal would 
ameliorate the bias against the corporate form by reducing the ex 
ante tax cost of investing in the corporate sector. The result 
would be an unambiguous reduction in the tax disincentive to 
invest in corporations, since the consumption tax benefit with 
respect to the distribution tax that is already available (at the 
efficiency cost of retaining earnings that otherwise would be 
distributed or holding stock that would otherwise be sold) would 
simply be extended to allow earnings reallocations that, on a 
pre-tax basis, are more desirable than leaving earnings in the 
corporation where they arise or than leaving the stock in the 
hands of the shareholder who owned the stock during the period 
that the corporation derived the earnings. Further, because the 
benefit is only a timing one, the proposal runs the risk of 
inefficiently biasing investment in favor of corporate equity 
(again assuming no other change in the law) only if three 
unlikely conditions all hold: interest rates become very high; 
investors perceive a very substantial pre-tax advantage in being 
able to reallocate earnings to other vehicles over leaving earnings 
in the corporation where they arise or continuing to hold stock; 
and the marginal investor is in a bracket above the maximum 
35% bracket for corporations. (For purposes of the last 
requirement, the tax on NII should be added to the shareholder’s 
income tax bracket.) Under these circumstances, the slightly 
lower rate on corporate equity as compared to other forms of 
investment for high-tax investors, together with the extension of 
that tax rate to reallocated profits, might create a tax bias in 
favor of investment in the corporate form. Note, however, that in 
particular the second condition is unlikely to hold. It is the fact 
that keeping profits in the corporation where they arise is a close 
substitute for reallocating them to other investments that creates 
the deadweight loss that the proposal seeks to reduce in the first 
place. 
 
 33 For a general discussion of this phenomenon, see R. Glenn Hubbard, Corporate 
Tax Integration: A View from the Treasury Department, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 115, 118–19 
(1993). See also TREASURY REPORT, supra note 5, ch. 13. 
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Wholly apart from the consequences of adopting the 
proposal, the magnitude of the tax bias against the corporate 
form would change, and its sign possibly even reverse, if 
Congress succeeds in materially reducing the top corporate rate, 
especially in light of the tax on NII.34 By lowering the rate on 
corporate investment and leaving the rates on pass-through 
entities and sole proprietorships unchanged, an advantage to 
investment in corporations would arise to the extent the ultimate 
tax on corporate distributions (or gains on the sale of corporate 
stock) does not outweigh the benefits of a lower rate on corporate 
income compared to the income of more highly-taxed investors in 
pass-through entities and sole proprietorships. The proposal here 
would increase that advantage to some extent, because it lowers 
the effective rate on returns from corporate equity. In general, 
the trade-off becomes taxation at a lower entity rate for corporate 
equity in exchange for an ultimate excise tax on distribution for 
consumption rather than on distribution simply. The longer the 
time between the investment and consumption and the greater 
the discount rate, the lower the real effective tax on corporate 
equity that would otherwise be distributed and reallocated. 
Again, however, in light of the availability of self-help in the 
form of earnings retention (especially where distributions are 
sensitive to expected shareholder uses of the distributions), it 
does not seem that any additional incentive to invest in the 
corporate form or revenue loss from adoption of the proposal will 
be substantial, while any efficiency benefits with respect to 
already-invested amounts would persist. In short, if Congress 
lowers the maximum corporate rate, the tax bias in favor of 
corporate equity will result from that rate reduction, not from the 
proposal. Even if corporate investment becomes tax-favored, it 
would still be welfare-improving to provide the deduction if 
distribution behavior is sensitive to the tax on distributions, a 
topic briefly discussed in the next section. 
III. ADDITIONAL BEHAVIORAL EFFECTS 
The preceding section described the most easily predicted 
effect of adoption of the proposal, but other adjustments are 
 
 34 Proposals to reduce corporate rates enjoy theoretical support across a wide 
segment of the political spectrum. See, e.g., MAX BAUCUS, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON FIN., 
SUMMARY OF STAFF DISCUSSION DRAFT: INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TAX REFORM 2 (2013), 
available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Chairman's%20Staff%20Inter 
national%20Discussion%20Draft%20Summary.pdf (advocating “significantly lower 
corporate tax rates”); HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 113TH CONG., DISCUSSION DRAFT 
ON TAX REFORM ACT OF 2014 (2014), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/up 
loadedfiles/statutory_text_tax_reform_act_of_2014_discussion_draft_022614.pdf (reducing 
the corporate tax rate to 25% under proposed section 3001 of the 2014 Act). 
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likely to occur as well. In general, the proposal potentially will 
have an impact across two additional behavioral margins: the 
corporation’s decision to distribute earnings or not, and the 
corporation’s decision to finance marginal investment with equity 
or not. Even if the overall efficiency consequences of adopting the 
proposal would be positive for the reasons discussed above, the 
question remains what the new steady state will be along all 
margins once all adjustments occur. For example, if the dividend 
tax rate does not markedly affect dividend policy, it is not clear 
that the proposal will reduce inefficient earnings retention (if 
corporations in fact retain earnings that should be distributed). 
Similarly, if managers finance marginal projects with retained 
earnings, the proposal may have little effect on levels of equity 
finance. More generally, the answer to whether adoption of the 
proposal would result in an increase in equity finance, in 
distributions, or in both, depends not only on the benefits from a 
reduction in the tax burden of owning corporate equity, but also 
on managerial incentives. Depending upon the role that 
dividends and equity issuances play in corporate finance and the 
alignment of managers’ and shareholders’ interests, the 
corporate-level behavioral effects of a dividend tax reduction can 
differ. 
A.  Theories of Managerial Behavior 
Currently, four main views vie for explanatory power over 
managerial behavior;35 the consequences of adoption of the 
proposal depend in some measure on the extent to which each 
theory accounts for managerial behavior. This subsection briefly 
outlines these views and the consequences of adoption of the 
proposal under each of them. Subsection B then reviews some 
recent empirical findings. 
Until the 1980s, economists generally held what has since 
been termed the “old” or “traditional” view of managerial 
behavior. The old view assumes that managers seek to maximize 
shareholder value and that corporations finance new projects 
with either debt or equity.36 Because dividend taxes have the 
effect of “double-taxing” corporate earnings, managers incline 
toward debt finance, which permits a deduction to the firm for 
 
 35 Alan Auerbach & Kevin Hassett, Dividend Taxes and Firm Valuation: New 
Evidence 1–2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11959, 2006). Another 
theory, the “tax irrelevance” view, posits that the marginal investor is tax -indifferent and 
therefore that dividend taxes are entirely irrelevant to managerial finance decisions; the 
evidence does not appear to support this view. Id. 
 36 Zodrow, supra note 30, at 497. 
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interest payments,37 and away from equity finance, which 
provides no deductions for dividends paid. To the extent the old 
view holds, a dividend reinvestment deduction enhances the 
attractiveness of equity finance to managers because the greater 
after-tax value to shareholders of dividend payments reduces the 
cost of equity to the corporation.38 Similarly, the overall increase 
in corporate equity implies greater total dividend payouts.39 
Further, where managers know that shareholders expect to 
reallocate distributions rather than to spend them on 
consumption, one would expect an increase in distributions. 
A second view, and the primary competitor to the old view, is 
the “new” view. In its basic formulation, it likewise posits that 
managers seek to maximize shareholder value, but it assumes 
that corporations finance marginal investments with retained 
earnings rather than with new equity or debt issues.40 In this 
setting, dividend taxes are thought to have no effect on the 
marginal finance decision or the size of dividend distributions, 
though they do affect the price of corporate equity.41 When 
retained earnings are available to finance new projects, a firm 
will use those earnings for the project, and the dividend tax 
operates similarly to an excise tax.42 Because the present value of 
such a tax is constant, changes in the dividend tax rate have no 
differential impact on the timing of the dividend payment—it has 
the same present value no matter when paid.43 Yet even if the 
new view better explains manager behavior than does the old 
view, the proposal should result in an increase in distributions, 
because the excise tax effect, which is to say deferral, continues 
even on distributed earnings that are reinvested, assuming 
managers seek to maximize shareholder value.44 To some extent, 
 
 37 Hans-Werner Sinn, Taxation and the Cost of Capital: The “Old” View, the “New” 
View, and Another View, in 5 TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 25, 27–29 (David Bradford 
ed., 1991). 
 38 Roger Gordon & Martin Dietz, Dividends and Taxes 3–4, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 12292, 2006). 
 39 Raj Chetty & Emmanuel Saez, An Agency Theory of Dividend Taxation 1 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13538, 2007). 
 40 Zodrow, supra note 30, at 497. 
 41 Auerbach & Hassett, supra note 35, at 1; Zodrow, supra note 30, at 497–500. 
 42 Zodrow, supra note 30, at 500. See also Seppo Kari et al., The Impact of Dividend 
Taxation on Dividends and Investment: New Evidence Based on a Natural Experiment 7 
(CESifo, Working Paper No. 2756, 2009), available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ 
ceswps/_2756.html. 
 43 Raj Chetty & Emmanuel Saez, Dividend and Corporate Taxation in an Agency 
Model of the Firm, 2 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 1, 4–5 (2010). 
 44  The cost to the firm of the dividend tax is constant. Id. But the cost to 
shareholders is not under current law, because the after-tax proceeds available for 
investment are reduced by the dividend tax. Because the proposal extends consumption 
tax treatment to reinvested distributions, shareholders continue to derive a benefit from 
deferring consumption of the distribution. 
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however, this analysis assumes that distribution policy is 
informed by managers’ knowledge that distributions are likely to 
be reinvested rather than spent on consumption. Equivalently 
(under the assumption of alignment of shareholder and 
management incentives), it assumes that shareholders dictate 
the timing of distributions. 
A third view posits that dividend payouts serve a signaling 
function in the public corporation setting.45 They enable 
managers to demonstrate that the firm is “healthy.”46 Under the 
signaling view, a cut in the dividend price generally reduces the 
cost of the (costly) signal and so should result in an increase in 
the size, if not the number, of dividend payouts. However, under 
at least one formulation of the signaling model, the dividend tax 
actually increases efficiency, at least for dividend-paying firms 
not engaged in share repurchase programs.47 For these firms, the 
increase in dividends could actually result in an efficiency cost. 
Finally, a more recent theory posits that principal-agent 
problems afflict managerial decision making where ownership 
and control of the corporation are separate. Because owners 
cannot effectively monitor managers, managers pursue policies 
inconsistent with those that maximize shareholder value.48 
Under this view, managers use retained earnings to fund “perks 
and pet projects” even though shareholders would prefer that the 
earnings be distributed or spent on a better investment.49 The 
effect of the reinvestment deduction on managers’ behavior in 
this setting depends on the amount of earnings on hand, though 
in the model developed by economists Raj Chetty and Emmanuel 
Saez, a reduction in dividend taxation would be associated with 
an unambiguous welfare improvement whether or not earnings 
are available. Under their model, if dividend taxes are lowered, 
cash-rich firms that otherwise would use retained earnings to 
pursue unproductive pet projects face pressure to distribute the 
earnings, and cash-poor firms that otherwise would not finance a 
marginal meritorious project do so with additional equity 
issues.50 The first of these effects relates to the question of 
whether to retain or distribute earnings, while the second relates 
to the question of whether to finance with equity or not. Hence 
the productivity effect of a reduction in the dividend tax on the 
marginal finance decision appears to be modest but 
 
 45 Id. at 2. 
 46 Gordon & Dietz, supra note 38, at 2. 
 47 Id. at 27. 
 48 Id. at 28–29. 
 49 Chetty & Saez, supra note 43, at 2. 
 50 Id. at 15. 
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unambiguously positive under the agency view: A dividend tax 
reduction increases the incentive of cash-rich firms to distribute 
earnings that should be distributed and reduces the disincentive 
of cash-poor firms to finance with equity because of the tax 
disadvantage as compared with debt. 
B.  Empirical Findings 
Evidence regarding the explanatory power of the theories is 
somewhat mixed, but it appears that the most robust theory is 
the agency model, followed by the traditional model. François 
Gourio and Jianjun Miao, summarizing literature on the 2003 
dividend tax cut, report substantial increases in dividend payouts 
following that cut, which lowered top dividend rates from 35 to 
15%.51 Chetty and Saez report similar findings regarding the 
2003 dividend tax cut, noting in addition that the response was 
rapid and larger where executives were substantial shareholders 
or where substantial shareholders served on the board of 
directors.52 These phenomena are mostly consistent with the 
predictions of the traditional model and more consistent with 
their agency model, but less so with the other models.53 Gourio 
and Miao’s model also predicts substantial efficiency gains from 
reduction of the barrier to efficient allocation of investment that 
result from the rate cut.54 Roger Gordon and Martin Dietz, 
reviewing findings dating back to 1980, similarly conclude that 
the agency model best fits the evidence.55 Further, under any of 
these theories except the signaling model, a reduction in dividend 
taxes has no efficiency losses at the managerial level; under the 
traditional and agency views, it results in unambiguous 
efficiency gains at the managerial level. 
These studies focused on the 2003 dividend tax reduction (as 
well as, in some cases, on other tax law changes), a less targeted 
but larger tax benefit than that proposed here. It was less 
targeted in that it applied without regard to the purpose for 
which dividends were spent; it was larger in that it represented a 
dramatic rate reduction, at least in nominal terms, when 
measured against prior law. (The extent to which it represented 
a real rate reduction depends on the availability under prior law 
 
 51 See generally François Gourio & Jianjun Miao, Firm Heterogeneity and the 
Long-Run Effect of Dividend Tax Reform, 2 AM. ECON. J.: MACROECONOMICS 131 (2010) 
(summarizing recent studies).  
 52 Chetty & Saez, supra note 43, at 2. 
 53 See James Poterba, Taxation and Corporate Payout Policy, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 
171, 174–75 (2004) (predicting a high response to the 2003 reduction in taxes on 
dividends). 
 54 Gourio & Miao, supra note 51, at 133. 
 55 Gordon & Dietz, supra note 38, at 28–29. 
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of better-taxed substitutes for distributions, of which two are of 
significance: share repurchases qualifying for sale-or-exchange 
treatment,56 and simple sales of stock to third parties.) These two 
features of the comparison between the 2003 change and the 
reinvestment deduction proposal cut in opposite directions. Other 
things equal, a larger tax reduction should result in a larger 
behavioral response, because of the larger avoided tax cost 
associated with the more favored activity when measured against 
prior law. On the other hand, the deduction reinvestment 
proposal targets more elastic behavior than did the 2003 Act. 
Distributions earmarked for consumption (to the extent 
shareholders control or effectively inform distribution policy) are 
inherently less elastic to dividend tax rates than are 
distributions that are expected to be reinvested, because 
consumption is not a close substitute for continued investment. 
By contrast, the effect of reinvesting distributed earnings is 
simply a reallocation of the shareholder’s capital; leaving the 
earnings in the corporation where they arise is a relatively close 
substitute for that activity, which means that in many cases 
taxing earnings on distribution that otherwise would be 
reinvested will result in non-distribution of the earnings (again, 
assuming distribution policy is affected by the shareholders’ 
expected use of the distribution proceeds). In short, whatever the 
pre-tax difference between distribution of earnings for the 
purpose of reallocation on one hand, and non-distribution of 
earnings on the other, it is almost certainly too small to warrant 
the payment of a 15 or 20% tax for the privilege. The dividend 
reinvestment proposal, because it provides a benefit only for 
deferred consumption, targets tax-motivated earnings retention 
when the alternative would be reinvestment. 
The implication is that the deduction proposal is likely to 
result in a more modest behavioral change than that of the 2003 
Act at both the shareholder and the corporate levels, but in a 
more dramatic welfare improvement when measured in terms of 
the ratio of avoided deadweight loss to reductions in tax 
revenues. In short, the proposal appears to offer a fairly 
unambiguous policy improvement. 
CONCLUSION 
The object of the proposal discussed here is twofold. First, it 
is to identify a low-cost reform measure that is relatively modest 
in ambition, clearly favorable in efficiency terms, and therefore 
more likely than a comprehensive reform proposal to meet with 
 
 56 § 302(a)–(b). 
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serious consideration from policy makers in the present 
environment. Second, it is to point in the direction of larger-scale 
reform that would bring with it much more substantial benefits, 
including dramatic simplification and enhanced efficiency, if and 
when global reform becomes a viable policy option. Enactment of 
the reinvestment deduction would accomplish these goals by 
eliminating substantial efficiency losses at little revenue cost in 
static terms (and possibly by generating tax revenue increases in 
dynamic terms) and establishing a precedent for a simplified, 
mixed income-consumption tax regime applicable to all business 
income. 
 
